Introduction

            Niccolo Machiavelli had a unique and unprecedented political perspective.  Largely, this can be attributed to his keen affective sense.  His discourse on becoming a prince, maintaining power, success, and stability revolutionized political thought—if not through direct effect, then at least by presenting something so utterly different from the norm.  Machiavelli redefined virtue, concentrating on the philosophic aspect of ideology, one removed from Christian mores.  While relating affect to this unique view, it is helpful to draw out a conception of affect itself; for this, the work of Benedict de Spinoza's The Ethics can help look interpret Machiavelli's The Prince from an affective standpoint.

 

Analysis

            In The Prince, Machiavelli ignored the standard mores of his society as he constructed his practical guide to power. Instead of basing his theories on Christian morality, as normative paradigms would have instructed, he based them on pure pragmatics, basing theories on examples from history which were successful in achieving, sustaining, and flourishing with power.  His study came not from what is right or good in a moral sense, but from what worked.  Before ascertaining the significance of that, implicitly or explicitly, one should examine his work in greater detail.

            According to Machiavelli, when a prince is made a ruler, that "prince is always compelled to injure those who have made him the new ruler. (35)"  Machiavelli did not want one's indebtedness to interfere with his effective ruling ability.  He supported this belief by describing the consequences of the converse situation: "[w]hoever is responsible for another's becoming powerful ruins himself, because this power is brought into being either by ingenuity or by force, and both of these are suspect to the one who has become powerful.(35)"  There is an inherent cynicism in Machiavielli’s statements which allude to human nature.  But before concentrating on that aspect of his work, one should look to Spinoza and see how he would explain these attitudes.  The Christian beliefs of "good" and "evil" were not necessarily Spinoza's, and perhaps his definitions will better help ground Machiavelli's reasoning. 

            Spinoza says that: "[w]e call good, or evil, what is useful to, or harmful to, preserving our being, what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting.(204)" This definition explains how Machiavelli's advice could be "good."  It would certainly imply that one must take care to insure one's power to act and not to take such power for granted.

            Machiavelli also said, concerning a new prince, that: "Whoever becomes the master of a city accustomed to freedom, and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed himself.(48)"  This is a sum statement on his discussion which follows that one who is a Prince, in a monarchic rule, cannot govern a city which was once free without problems such as hate and resentment.  These are undesirable and will ultimately lead to the prince's downfall, so Machiavelli suggests rather to destroy the city.  He implies that people do not like to give up something that they once had.  There, Machiavelli well understands affect in the regard that people who do not have a good thing will not desire it if they do not know of it; they will not feel the absence of their ignorance.  Yet, if they savor whatever this thing is on an occasion, they will forever more want this thing and will resent or hate those that take it away from them.  For Machiavelli, not being hated is a major tenet, as well as a key survival factor.  As he noted, "One of the most powerful safeguards a prince can have against conspiracies is to avoid being hated by the populace.[103]"  Thus, while he advises the Prince not to act necessarily through Christian goodness, he must still appear good enough to be liked.

            Machiavelli realized, though, that if one is not going to destroy a city then he should neither change it.  "He must change neither their laws nor their taxes.  In this way, in a very short space of time the new principality will be rolled into one with the old.(36)"  As with corresponding to his previous point, he reiterates that you cannot take away what people have or they will become angered.  He further implies that people's memories and passions fade over time; they will easily forget their old rulers if their rights are inviolable and unchanged.  Spinoza would agree with Machiavelli on this point when he says: "[t]he image of a future or past thing . . . is weaker than the image of a present thing; and consequently, an affect toward a future or past thing is milder, other things equal, than an affect toward a present thing.(205)"  Machiavelli also correctly read affect by knowing that as long as one does not offend too greatly, one will have no reason to revenge: "Men must be either pampered or crushed, because they can get revenge for small injuries but not for grievous ones.(37-8)"  A change of rule is neither a small injury nor grievous one and the difference merely passes with time.

            Machiavelli’s discourse on being a prince also dealt with attributes which one should possess, in particular, he takes time to discuss about the qualities of generosity and parsimony.  Machiavelli says that "a prince cannot practise the virtue of generosity in such a way that he is noted for it, except to his cost, he should if he is prudent not mind being called a miser.(93)"  Machiavelli continued to explain that one that is known for being generous must continue to give or be hated.  This goes back to the discussion about taking away something one has.  Yet, if the people never receive this generosity and the prince continues to be a miser, he will have a careful watch over his funds, and will have the capital necessary when the need might arise.  Here again, Spinoza’s words prove useful: "No virtue can be conceived prior to this [virtue] (viz. the striving to preserve oneself).(211)"  By being a miser, a prince helps alleviate a depleting of funds which can lead only to his ruin; if he is not ruined, he will be forced to take measures such as increasing taxes, which will give to him being hated (which will also lead to his ruin).  Spinoza also said that: "When each man most seeks his own advantage for himself, then men are most useful to one another."  This can be juxtaposed with the above example, and it is clear that Machiavelli's intentions reflect the same spirit as that of Spinoza's point.  By a prince being a miser, (as long as he was not previously generous) he maintains his ability to help and protect the people; by helping himself, he helps others.

            Machiavelli also goes into a discussion of whether it is better to be hated or feared.  He has this to say: "I conclude that since some men love as they please but fear when the prince pleases, a wise prince should rely on what he controls, not on what he cannot control.  He must only endeavour, as I've said, to escape being hated.(98)" Once again, here with love and hate, Machiavelli shows how he understands affect.  Regarding these two emotions, he explains his reasoning: "The bond of love is one which men, wretched creatures that they are, break when it is to their advantage to do so; but fear is strengthened by a dread of punishment which is always effective. (96-7)"  Machiavelli realized that the affect that controls men is more beneficial than the one that is "moral."  In general concept, it would not seem that Spinoza would agree that it is better to be feared than loved, but one might change their mind if they look a little deeper into Spinoza’s work.

            Instilling fear in men may not be good in itself, but Machiavelli claims that the doing so will prevent worse crimes.  As an example, if executing a man will keep others from killing and robbing, then it is worth it.  Spinoza clearly states that "[f]rom the Guidance of reason, we shall follow the greater of two goods or the lesser of two evils.(234)"  Certainly executing one man as an evil is preferable than many others being killed due to leniency.  Further, Spinoza specifically outlined the need of a state to act in such a manner.

Society has the power to prescribe a common rule of life, to make laws, and to maintain them -- not by reason which cannot restrain the affects, but by threats.  This society, maintained by laws and the power it has of preserving itself, is called a state, and those who are defended by its law, citizens.(220)

Spinoza thus detailed what was necessary upon the foundation of a state.  His assessment of affect and the state appeared to agree with Machiavelli's.

            Machiavelli's unique vantage point on politics and affect continued as he discussed how a prince should honor his word.  He said that:

Contemporary experience shows that princes who have achieved great things have been those who have given their word lightly, who have known how to trick men with their cunning, and who, in the end, have overcome those abiding by honest principles.(99)

This is something, which on the surface seems to be an abhorrent quality for a prescribed more, but one that is nonetheless recognizable as extant in public policies and political dealings.  It is also apparent that this would be an effective political maneuver.  Machiavelli further justified this precept when he said: "[i]f all men were good, this precept would not be good; but because men are wretched creatures who would not keep their word to you, you need not keep your word to them.(100)" Yet, this is not the only passage where Machiavelli comments on the nature of man, either.  On several occasions he makes statements about humankind in general.  "One can make this generalization about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceivers, they shun danger and are greedy for profit.(96)" Thus, rather than morals, it is on these kinds of affective judgments that Machiavelli based his policies.  He understood how people were affected by passions, and by understanding those, how better to control them.  Indeed, one who took so much time studying people and affect would seem to agree; of people in general, Spinoza said: "The multitude is fickle and inconstant.(230)"

 

Conclusion

            Machiavelli understood full well how people were in general and how they would react given different affective situations.  He did this based on history and example, not from moral standpoints or judgments, and thus created a unique view which was based on effectiveness and power, not on convention or morals.  Spinoza’s studies on affect seem to confirm Machiavelli's approach to rulership.  His admissions regarding human failure led to men like Machiavelli to making the stands they did, proposingmaxims like "[s]o since men must sin, they ought rather to sin in that direction.(228)" or "follow . . . the lesser of two evils.(234)" or "From the guidance of reason we want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present one, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future one.(235)"  Spinoza seemed to imply that although there were set modes which were better or preferable to others, sometimes situations complicated the matter, where good was not good and evil was not evil, and one was forced to make hard choices to do what would ultimately be better.  That is where Machiavelli fit in.  Seemingly he instinctively reasoned the outcomes of such affective situations; he understood how people would react in given situations even when he had not worked it out, point by point.

            Thus, perhaps Machiavelli did not redefine virtue as it might appear at first glance.  Rather, it can be argued that he is pushing aside idealism to strive for functionalism.  In other words, he is moving past the black and whiteness of certain thinking—especially as it relates to Christian ideology where things are right and wrong, good and evil—and layered the situational grey zones with which people are forced to deal.  Spinoza has clear definitions of affect, good and evil, and so forth, but he also realized the need to adapt to complicated issues.  Both men grasp affect well, their uniquec reasoning based on their willingness to go beyond traditional philosophy and probe the more complex levels of human interaction, reaching down to basic human motivations and what made men do what they do beyond the call of abstract good and evil.  Machiavelli realized that religion in some ways was a front, and that people do not always act as they are expected or as they say they do.  As he noted:

To those seeing and hearing him, he should appear a man of compassion, a man of faith, a man of integrity, a kind and a religious man.  And there is nothing so important as to seem to have this last quality.  Men in general judge by their eyes rather than by their hands; because everyone is in a position to watch, few are in a position to come in close touch with you.(101)

Machiavelli understood the hypocrisy in men, especially of ones in power, be they a prince or pope.  In fact, he called the pope little more than another prince, one used to deceit and cunning (pg. 100).  Perhaps it is because he directly undermined the authority of a major power like the pope that he was denounced as evil.  In fact, Machiavelli's own assessment would probably indicate as much.  It was not due to any inherent evil in his work, but rather because such assessments threatened the power and reputation of the church

            Relativity is the key, as is taking Machiavelli's words in context.  If one examines The Prince through Christian eyes, perhaps it is evil.  Yet, if one examines it through Spinoza and sees Machiavelli as the striving for the betterment and fulfillment of human nature and the lesser of two evils concept not as a willingness to inflict cruelty, but rather a method to insure long-term aid, then it is not an evil, but just a set of ideas, which seem to have a firm grasp on humans and their affective reactions, with which one can merely agree or disagree.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1.  Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince.  London, Penguin Books, 1961, 1975, 1981.

2.  Spinoza, Benedict de, A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works.  Princeton,

Princeton University Press, 1994.

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